What do Pashtuns think of Rajputs

21 2 Land of Youth: Population Growth without End Over the past decade, Pakistan ranked sixth among the most populous countries in the world. Estimates for 2012 assume a population of more than 192 million people. If this information is confirmed, this would correspond to an increase of approx. 47 percent since the last census in 1998 (131 million) and 20 million more inhabitants than the United Nations had forecast for the country's population development. Pakistan is one of the fastest growing countries in the world. On average, each woman gave birth to 3.7 children between 2005 and 2010. Although this is a decrease compared with the period from 1995 to 2000 (5.0 children), it is still the highest value in the region after Afghanistan (average 2.8 children / woman). Since 1947 (30 million) the population has increased roughly sixfold. According to new forecasts, Pakistan will have around 237 million inhabitants in 2025 and up to 379 million in 2050. Population programs have repeatedly failed in the past because of the limited political will of the Pakistani governments and ultimately because of the inability of the authorities to implement corresponding plans. Most of the time, the availability of foreign funding (notably from USAID, the U.S. Agency for International Development) determined whether population programs were launched, revived, or canceled in Pakistan. In this context, surprisingly, religious moments only played a subordinate role. Religious forces ran a storm against Ayub Khan's birth control program in the 1950s to bring down his first military government. By contrast, Zia-ul-Haq, who promoted the Islamization of society in the 1980s, 22 ignored a recommendation drawn up by the Council for Islamic Ideology to discontinue all birth control programs due to their incompatibility with Islamic values. In the religious-nationalist spectrum, against the background of the Pakistani-Indian antagonism since 1947, the idea of ​​being able to compete with India through high population growth has been extremely popular. In addition to the high growth rates, the continual movements of refugees from Afghanistan since the late 1970s have influenced the country's demographics. Since the outbreak of the Afghan war in 1979, up to 5.5 million Afghans have been looking for censuses in Pakistan Censuses in Pakistan are always also a political issue. After regular censuses in 1951, 1961, 1972 and 1981, the surveys planned for 1991 were delayed by seven years until 1998. The following ten-year interval could not be adhered to either. The current census only started in 2011 three years later. The reasons cited for the delay are the flood of the century (2010), insufficient funding and security concerns in some regions. The census should be carried out in 2011/12 and the results should not be published before 2014. Significantly, at the same time as the start of the new surveys in 2011, numerous political controversies arose. In Sindh, for example, the housing census that preceded the census recently boiled up the conflict between Sindhis and Mohajirin, as the former accused the latter of taking advantage. In Hyderabad and Karachi in particular, extremely high growth rates were determined for households, whereas in Punjab they were remarkably low, whereupon a completely new survey was discussed (Express Tribune, January 11, 2012). The population figures are so politically explosive because they result in the distribution and delimitation of the constituencies of parliamentary and provincial members associated with the population distribution and volume. In addition, the population of the provinces is the key for the federal grants from the annual national tax revenue and for the quota allocation for access to the civil service. 23 took refuge in Pakistan in the 1980s, a large proportion of whom acquired Pakistani citizenship in recent decades; others are still living in the country with temporary residence status as refugees. A registration process ordered by the state in winter 2006/07 showed that at that time more than 1.5 million Afghans with refugee status were still living in Pakistan. They were assured of a toleration until the end of 2012, which was recently extended by another six months due to international pressure. The majority of those affected live mainly in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. However, most of those so classified were born and raised there. The unreported number of unregistered Afghans living illegally in Pakistan is difficult to estimate, but it is probably quite high in the tribal areas and in Karachi. In addition, many Afghans who have returned to their country travel regularly to Pakistan to work, visit family members or get medical care. A side effect of the enormous population growth is a relatively young population. According to UN statistics, 35 percent of the population was younger than 15 in 2010 (1990: 43.7 percent); life expectancy for women is 65.4 years, for men almost 64 years; Trend cautiously increasing. Due to the development of the birth rate, the proportion of those able to work between the ages of 15 and 49 is growing faster than the population as a whole. Given the high level of underemployment and widespread poverty, Pakistan is faced with the burning question of how this population growth can be absorbed economically. Possible scenarios range between the following poles: on the one hand, a “successful absorption of the demographic dividend” by a newly created IT industry that employs the majority of the workforce, and on the other hand, “radicalization and spread of extremist tendencies due to the lack of prospects for a large part of the population” . The education sector plays a key role in promoting the first scenario as well as averting the second. The quality of training in public institutions is extremely poor and has ideologically dangerous traits (see Chapter 4, “Political Culture”). According to the last census, more than half of the adult population (56 percent) are illiterate (see box on page 146). The illiteracy rate among young people is only around 31 percent; There are, however, great differences between the sexes (41 percent female versus 21 percent male, Yusuf in Cohen 2011). The position of women Overall, women represent the most disadvantaged social group in Pakistan. The tribal traditions of many ethnic groups and biraderi (see below “The system of the biraderi”, page 33) - Pashtuns, Baluch, but also the Punjabis - are building on social values ​​that women only allow a very limited radius of action. However, it is the socio-economic conditions that determine the extent to which the principle of purdah (curtain) - covering oneself and the strict gender segregation aimed at in public and, in some cases, private spaces - is applied: No average family in rural Punjab can do without the work of women get by in agriculture. In such circumstances, full veils or strict gender segregation, as is expected of the women of the most prestigious rural families for reasons of status, are hardly practical. Belonging to different classes, families and cultural reference systems is also decisive with regard to discrimination against women. The very small female urban upper class, who are more at home in London, Dubai and Sydney, have high-quality international university degrees and are involved in welfare organizations and the women's movement, faces a broad mass of women who can neither read nor write and have their own time Their male family members do not even take their lives to the district center seven kilometers away for shopping. In many places women have no access to education and training or to independent judicial bodies. Most schools are either only for girls or only for boys. When families send their sons and daughters to 25 co-ed higher education institutions, it requires a conscious choice. Pakistan's constitution guarantees equal rights for women and men and officially prohibits all gender discrimination Discrimination through local legal conventions. As punishment for her brother, who was then twelve years old, supposed to have sought the presence of a Jatoi-biraderi girl, she was the victim of gang rape by fourteen men in her village. Mukhtar Mai then went public with her story. The extent to which a traditional village council (panchayat) actually sanctioned the rape cannot be definitively clarified. Her family charged the rapists and six of them were convicted. As a result of a revision process, all but one were released in 2011. The case caused quite a stir in the Pakistani public and even around the world. Mukhtar Mai decided to go on living in her village. For several years she has been running two schools and a charity that was founded under her name. Since she was unable to read or write at the time of the rape - at the age of thirty - she enrolled in her own school when she founded her school. Many supporters of the women's movement were appalled when, in May 2009, Mukhtar married a police officer who was assigned to protect her during the indictment against the rapists. However, the process gives an insight into the traditional constraints and conventions that women are exposed to, especially in rural Punjab and Sindh: Due to the shame associated with this, the policeman's first wife initially refused to marry. When her husband threatened with divorce, however, she hurried to ask Mai to marry. The background was that the first wife in a so-called watta-satta connection - her two brothers had married sisters of her husband - was married. The first wife and her brothers feared that a divorce between the policeman and his first wife would inevitably lead to the divorce of their brothers in accordance with the locally valid logic of honor and justice. 26 tion. At the same time, however, the Hudood laws (literally: restriction) passed under Zia-ul-Haq continue to exist in criminal law to this day. In its original form, the Hu dood laws mixed up allegations of rape and adultery: a woman had to cite four adult male witnesses to prove rape by 2006; if she could not do this, she ran the risk of being prosecuted and accused of adultery or premarital sex (zina), with the maximum penalty being stoning. In 2006, the zina and witness regulation was repealed by the so-called Women's Protection Act. However, in 2010 the Federal Sharia Court ruled that the law was partially unconstitutional and inconsistent with Islam. The unequal treatment of men and women and of female and male plaintiffs and witnesses was also anchored in the provisions on retaliation (qisas) and compensation (diyat) of criminal law. According to these legal concepts, it is legal to give a female family member as a commodity to the family of the injured party in order to redress a crime. The Senate rejected a law against domestic violence passed by parliament in 2009. To this end, a law was implemented to empower women in the area of ​​inheritance law and against forced marriages, making child marriages and forced marriages, among other things, legally punishable. So-called honor killings are a particularly dark chapter in Pakistan. In 2011, 943 cases of honor killings of women were officially recorded. They are often carried out by close family members, usually the husbands or brothers of the women. Domestic violence - including cases of burns, chemical burns (acid attacks), torture, rape, amputation of limbs - and sexual harassment in public are increasingly registered. Between 2009 and 2011 there were 11,798 acts of violence against women, almost three quarters of them in Punjab. In 2012, filmmaker Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy of Pakistani origin won an Oscar for best documentary film for a controversial film about women who were burned with acetic acid by their families. 27 Facets of Islam Well over 90 percent of the Pakistani population are Muslims. This is not surprising, given that Pakistan was founded as a home for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Although Islam is supposed to form the unifying national bracket, at the same time there are various currents of Islam in Pakistani society that tend to have a fragmenting effect. According to the Islamic schools of law, 77 percent of the population are Hanafi Sunnis. With 15 to 20 percent, the Shiites represent the second largest religious group in an Islamic country after Iran. The demarcation between Shiites and Sunnis originally goes back to the dispute over the rightful succession of the Prophet in 632 AD. Nowadays, Shiites and Sunnis also differ in religious rituals and forms of organization. For Shiites, the Ashura processions are the highlight of the passion celebrations in the Islamic month of Muharram. The most important Shiite groups in Pakistan are the so-called Seventh Shiites (Ismailites), for whom the consanguinity with the Prophet Muhammad plays no role and who only recognize the period of activity of seven Imams (600-760) as legitimate, as well as the twelve Shiites, which still include the creative period of five other imams (600–940). The Ismailis make up the majority of the population in Gilgit-Baltistan, although many of them also live concentrated in Karachi. Far more numerous, on the other hand, and scattered all over the country, are the twelve Shiites. However, the denominational assignment only serves to distinguish ethnic groups in a few cases. There are numerically strong Shiite communities among the Mohajirin and Sindhis, but there are also Shiites among the Punjabis and Pashtuns. Although in the course of history tensions between Shiites and Sunnis repeatedly emerged, which also resulted in violence, membership of the Shia did not lead to political exclusion for a long time. One of the reasons for this may be that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was a Shiite. It is interesting that the Shiite denomination of the controversial political families of the Bhutto-Zardaris is seldom discussed in political debates to this day. Given the recent increase in sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shiites, however, there is a risk of denominational affiliations becoming politicized. Mystical currents like Sufism play a prominent role in Pakistani society. The big Sufi orders such as Naqshbandiya, Chishtiya, Qadiriya or Suhrawardiyya have a special status. There is also a heterodox veneration of saints in Pakistan that is not directly assigned to any order. After the death of a saint, his authority is transferred to the tomb and to his personal successors, who are then called pir (Sufi saint, spiritual leader). The teaching of Sufism is based on the fact that the pir as a teacher (murshid) instructs the believer as a student (murid). A special spirituality is associated with the supposed descent from the prophet in particular. So there are many Pakistanis who visit the Say Sufi Shrine near Uch Sharif, Bahawalpur District. In some places women do not have access to the inside of a shrine or have to use a separate entrance to one side of the tomb. 29 yed or Qureishi, which should indicate a relationship with Muhammad and his tribe. Sufi teachers also often receive the honorary title of sheikh. A sheikh has spiritual blessing power (baraka or karamat) and is seen as a friend of God (wali). Through a celibate lifestyle he strives for a special closeness to God. Sheikhs, for example, often choose to live as hermits or as traveling preachers. The tombs (shrines) of saints, hermits and pious men are becoming important places of worship to which millions of people in Pakistan make pilgrimages every day to pray or seek spiritual assistance. At the shrine of the saint there are also daily feeding of the poor and often weekly musical performances; here the day of death (Tod urs) of the saint is celebrated annually. Often pilgrims at these holy places fall into ecstasy or have other spiritual experiences.The shrines that are famous beyond the country's borders include the grave of Lal Shahbaz inside the shrine of the family of the poet and Sufi saint Khwaja Ghulam Farid in Kot Mithan in the Rajanpur district, southwest Punjab 30 Qalandar in Sehvan in Sindh, and that of Bahauddin Zakariya in Multan and that of Ali Hajvery (Data Ganj Bakhsh) in Lahore. Through Sufism and its shrine culture, musical traditions developed in Pakistan, which meanwhile contribute strongly to Pakistani identity and have achieved worldwide fame. Long-lasting spiritual chants (e.g. Qawwali; Ghazal), in which the relationship between God and oneself is discussed again and again, are usually accompanied by harmonium and tabla or dholak drummers. In doing so, use is made of spiritual texts such as those by Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi. Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (1948–1997) is considered the most famous qawwali singer who - discovered by the musician Peter Gabriel - also achieved international fame. Interestingly, Pakistani Sufi musicians are also highly regarded in India. Pakistani musicians are repeatedly hired for the soundtracks of Bollywood films. The shrine culture is now a political issue in Pakistan. On the one hand, shrines are extremely popular, and it is not uncommon for well-known politicians to make pilgrimages to shrines to get their blessings - for example for an election result. In the Punjab and Sindh, respected pirs (Sufi saints) also formed close political ties with large landowning families (see box on page 132). Sufi followers mostly organize themselves politically through the orders and through the Barelvi movement, named after the north Indian city of Bareilly, where its founder Ahmed Reza Khan (1856–1921) lived; she is committed to maintaining Sufism. On the other hand, Orthodox Muslims in particular see shrines as hoards of superstition, and the educated middle class also often see holy graves as places of ignorance, where greedy pirs eviscerate ordinary people. It cannot be dismissed out of hand, however, that the holy tombs in Pakistan represent important economic factors: Not only is there an infrastructure of their own for the pilgrims around them, but the alms giving are also considerable and fulfill an important function for the welfare of the poor Get free meals here. As a countercurrent to popular Sufism, a kind of popular Islam, Puritan, Islamist currents have emerged in Pakistan, especially since Zia-ul-Haq's policy of Islamization in the 1980s. In one form or another, they endeavor to spread a “pure Islamic teaching” and to cleanse the religion of its superstitious - that is, mystical - practices. These include, on the one hand, Deobandism, named after the spiritual center in Deoband, North India, and, on the other hand, Wahhabism, which, for example, Pakistani migrant workers bring with them from the Arabian Peninsula. The latter is also gaining in importance because patrons from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in particular finance Koran schools and mosques with a Wahhabi-inspired curriculum. The Islamists are a numerical minority in Pakistan. Nevertheless, their political influence has increased considerably in the past few decades, not only through their own parties, but also through their militant wings and youth organizations. Reli- The community of Ahmadiyya In 1889 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad founded the community of Ahmadiyya (Jamaat-e-Ahmadiya) in Qadiyan (today in Punjab, India). Their relatives in Pakistan are therefore also known as Qadiyani. They see their founding father as a prophet and themselves as a spiritually oriented Islamic movement. Since all other Islamic faiths only recognize Muhammad as a prophet, the Pakistani state declared the Ahmadis to be apostate Muslims and finally to be non-Muslims by law in 1974. The number of their followers is estimated at about two percent of the population; their spiritual center is the city of Rabwah, where about 65,000 of them live. Ahmadiyya is particularly widespread among open-minded, urban intellectuals. It included outstanding personalities, for example the first foreign minister, Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan, and the only Nobel Prize winner in Pakistan, Abdus Salam, who received this award in 1979 in the subject of physics. After being legally declared non-Muslim, the Ahmadis were discriminated against even more. This has pushed many of them into exile. The global network of the Ahmadiyya is coordinated from London and is characterized by identity-creating solidarity, humanitarian-social aid and worldwide missionary work. 32 highly motivated acts of violence, such as bomb attacks against Shiite and / or Sufi mosques and shrines, were carried out by Islamic extremists (see Chapter 4, “Discrimination and religious violence”). Other religious minorities are the Ahmadi, Sikhs, Hindus, Christians and a few Buddhists and Parsees who stayed in Pakistan after the division of British India. The majority of the Hindus live in Sindh, where they make up about 5 to 10 percent of the population. There are still a few thousand Sikhs in Punjab, especially in Lahore. With 2 percent of the total population, Christians represent a minority that is quite present in public life. Half of them are Catholics with an extensive infrastructure of dioceses and the seat of the archbishop in Lahore. It is difficult to determine the exact proportions of religious and denominational minorities in the total population. This is due on the one hand to the Pakistani census problem, but above all to the sensitivities that a non-Muslim denomination now encounters in the country. For fear of persecution, many minorities - as far as possible - hide their religious identity, for example the Ahmadis or the Hindus. Forms of social organization In Pakistani society there are archaic and modern forms of society. On the one hand, along the Indus are the winter grazing areas of Pashtun nomads, who continue to move on fixed routes to central Afghanistan over the course of the year and largely adhere to their customs. On the other hand, one finds a modern life in the districts of the middle and upper class. As in many other societies, in Pakistani modern and premodern ideas, rules, values ​​and norms are interwoven. Western ideas are widespread among the urban middle and upper classes, not least because a large part of the Pakistani elite goes to study in England or the USA. Nevertheless, one should not be blinded by symbols of modernity such as western clothing or technology. As a rule, modern set pieces blur with traditional social forms. Often “codes of honor”, ​​“class hierarchies” or “arranged marriages” are adhered to as a matter of course. Even Benazir Bhutto, who first became Prime Minister at the age of thirty-five and has always embodied modern Pakistan, entered into an arranged marriage. The biraderi system In the rural regions, two social models dominate, which can theoretically be distinguished from one another, but in reality often overlap: the biraderi system and the tribal system. The biraderi system can best be compared with the Indian caste system. Although the biraderi identities and their role in the choice of career and social mobility of individuals are becoming increasingly blurred in urban space, the majority of marriages still take place within one's own bira deri. Biraderis represent different status as well as professional and clan or tribal groups into which the members are born. This triple overlap of the biraderi concept ensures that the members of a biraderi belong without a doubt, but the clear assignment from the outside remains extremely difficult to grasp. So there is the category of "indigenous castes", which are differentiated according to tribal affiliation (Pashtuns, Baluch, Jat, Rajputs), then the professional classification and the socio-religious status category (Sayyed, Qureshi), but also those of the Group distinction between farmers and non-farmers introduced by colonial administration. While the British divided the former into landowners, tenants and workers, the latter were divided into various service caste (kammi) and lower caste (janglees). If we leave the foreign names aside, the biraderis based on the tribal and professional groups are the most powerful. This means that people belong to a certain professional and / or tribal caste in which their family ties also take place. There are castes of lower status, such as the “shoemakers”, “basket weavers / reed cutters” and “barbers”, 34 to which a certain name is assigned in the local context, such as moschi, paoli, kattanai or nai. Tribal-based biraderis are divided into clan, family and locality-based biraderis. For example, famous family clans such as the Legharis, Pitafis, Gurmanis or Jatoi belong to the superior Baloch biraderi. The influential families of the Khar and Hanjras are jats. In southern Punjab, where the biraderi identities are very important, marriages within the family unit are preferred (first cousins). If this is not possible, the marriage takes place within the extended biraderi association. On the one hand, this creates a very close social connection within a biraderi unit. On the other hand, however, it often acts as a blockade and causes extensive social stagnation in rural regions (see box on page 151). Tribal structures While the biraderi system is particularly widespread in the Punjab and Sindh, tribal structures dominate west of the Indus, particularly in Balochistan and the FATA. In contrast, combinations and overlaps of tribal structures and biraderis exist in the fertile valleys of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similarly, among the respected biraderis in southern Punjab and in the interior of Sindh, there are many names that refer to a Pashtun or Baluch tribal background. Overall, the tribal structures of the Baluch are much more hierarchical than that of the Pashtuns. In addition to the belief in a common ancestry, both tribal societies are characterized by the fact that they are divided into countless tribes and sub-tribes. For a tribal member, one's own social position results from the tribal classification. For this reason, membership of a tribe is not viewed as backward, but rather perceived as an extremely positive identity through which legitimation in the here and now takes place. The Baluch, like the Pashtuns, also have their own tribal codes of honor and law that regulate coexistence. In his award-winning book The Way of the Falcon, the writer Jamil Ahmad gives very sensitive insights into this tribal world, which is strongly shaped by the cult of masculinity, ideas of honor and the use of physical violence. At the center of tribal thinking, as in the biraderi system, is the clear demarcation of men and women. A man's honor is dependent on the behavior of his female family members and is also vulnerable through this. Even the suspicion of adultery or the display of femininity are understood as violations of honor, since the affected man seems unable to protect the honor of his wife and thus to maintain his own honor and that of his community of solidarity. If a violation of moral integrity is suspected, this must be sanctioned, which repeatedly leads to acts of blood revenge ("honor killings"). The subordinate position of women is based on values ​​and norms that are not necessarily of Islamic origin. In general, local and Islamic ideas repeatedly collide, for example in inheritance law and in jurisdiction, since Islam forbids blood vengeance. The Islamic clergy are also outside the Pashtun and Baluch tribal order. Ethnic diversity Pakistan is an extremely heterogeneous state in ethnolingual terms. More than ten different languages, each with numerous dialects, are spoken and there are countless ethnic groups. If one ignores the historical episode East Pakistan (Bengal, 1947–1971), one distinguishes five large groups: the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Mohajirin and Baluch. With the exception of the Mohajirin, most of the ethnic groups live in the provinces of the same name. Also worth mentioning and to be explained in more detail below are the Seraikis, Kashmiris and Hazaras. There is also an abundance of ethnic minorities that are only locally widespread. The Punjabis are the numerically dominant ethnic group in Pakistan (44 percent according to the 1998 census). Their language, Punjabi, is also spoken in Indian Punjab. The British referred to the Punjabis - as well as the Pashtuns, Sikhs or Gurkhas - as mar Punjabi Seraiki Urdu Shina Khowar Balti SINOTIBETIAN Baluchi Pashto Buruschaski Urban Centers Sindhi CHINA Karachi: L i ne of Co ntrol TURKMENISTAN TADZHISTAN TADJIKISTAN AFRICA CZECH REPUBLIC INDIAN 500 100 INDOAR DARDISH ISO LIERAN IRAN LANGUAGES PAKISTANS Peshawar Gilgit Multan Lahore Rawalpindi Quetta Gwadar Hyderabad Islamabad 16% Brahui DRAVIDIC 11% 7% 4% 12% 20% 48% 9% 10% 2 5% 5.5% 5% 2% 42.5% 16, 5% 18% 4% 13% 4% RURAL AREA: URBAN AREA: 49% Hindko Kohistani Kashmiri Other languages: The map shows the approximate distribution areas of the most important languages ​​in Pakistan. It is based on demographic information on the mother tongue in the 1998 census and supplementary assessments. The demarcation between different language areas is difficult because most of the residents grow up multilingual. Minority / majority language PRODUCIDO POR UN PRODUCTO EDUCATIVO DE AUTODESK PR ODUC ID OPORUNPRODUC TO EDUCA TI VO DEAU TO D ES K PRODUCIDO POR UN PRODUCTO EDUCATIVO DE AUTODESK PR ODUC ID O PO RUN PR ODUC TO ED UCA TIVO DEAU TO D ESK., 37 tial races which should emphasize their supposed "warlike character" in comparison to many other peoples on the Indian subcontinent. They have played a prominent role in administration and the army since the British colonial era. The Seraikis who live in southern Punjab and northern Sindh are often counted among the Punjabis. However, Seraiki is now officially recognized as an independent language, and there are also political efforts to set up a Seraiki province of its own (see Chapter 4, "Unequal Provinces"). This demarcation of the Seraikis from the Punjabis is a development of the last decades. The official share of the Seraikis in the total population was about 10.5 percent in 1998. The second largest population group in terms of numbers are the Pashtuns with 15.4 percent (1998) of the total population. In Pakistan they are often referred to as Pathans, but this name, which goes back to the British, has a colonial aftertaste. In addition, there are officially around 1.7 million Afghan refugees living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, most of whom can also be assigned to this ethnic group. In addition, there is a difficult to quantify number of Afghan Pashtuns who are staying illegally in Pakistan. Like the Punjabis, the Pashtuns, with their own Pashto language, which is part of the Eastern Iranian language family, are historically and traditionally counted among the "wild tribes" who have always defended their autonomy in the past and present. The most famous of the myriad tribes are the Kakar and Durrani in Balochistan, the Waziris and Mehsud in the southern Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Yusufzai, Orakzai, Shinwari, Mohmand and Turi in the northern. In the FATA in particular, tribal self-classification plays a major role in social organization, even though Islamist groups such as the Taliban are fighting these tribal structures. Other important brackets are the belief in the common descent of Qais ‘Abdur Rashid, a common code of honor (pashtunwali), according to which the equality of tribal members is of particular importance, and separate forms of social organization (jirga, hujra). In the majority of the Pashtuns, who live in the urban regions (e.g. in Karachi meanwhile more than a million) or in the irrigation oases 38 (e.g. in Swat or around Peshawar), such tribal thinking has often already worn off. The third largest ethnic group, with around 14 percent of the population, are the Sindhis, who mainly settle along the southern Indus Valley and in Karachi. The Pakka Sindhis, who were already resident in the country, can be roughly distinguished from those who have moved here over the centuries. The former probably also have other origins, but there are no historical sources that go so far back to prove this.The immigrants - various tribes of Rajputs from the east, Jats from the north and Baluchi from the west - originally moved to the banks of the Indus as nomads, over time adopted sedentary forms of life and assimilated linguistically to the majority society. The identity of the Sindhis emerged from the demarcation from the Hindus in Sindh, who were dominant in administration and economy until 1947, and was consolidated after the partition of India. The inhabitants of Pakistan who fled to the newly founded state after the partition of British India are called mohajirin. They can be found across the country, but predominantly numerically dominate in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. Due to their strong urban base, the mohajirin are predominantly present in the trade and economy of Pakistan. In the military, which traditionally represents a bastion of the Punjabis, a Mohajir rose to general and later to president for the first time with Pervez Musharraf. Although the Mohajirin make up only 7.6 percent of the population (1998), their language - Urdu - is the country's national language. Urdu, which is almost identical to Hindi but uses the Arabic script, was the language of the Muslims in the heartland of the Mughals, which is why it has its greatest distribution in Indian cities such as Delhi, Agra, Lucknow or Bhopal. The Punjabis who migrated from Eastern Punjab to Pakistan in 1947 also have a certain double identity. About 25 percent of the Punjabi population has mohajirin roots, although Punjabi and not mohajir prevailed as a moment of identity. A good example of this is Zia-ul-Haq, whose Punjab identity is emphasized again and again, although it is quickly forgotten that he comes from Jalandhar, India. 39 In 1998, 3.6 percent of the population stated Baluchi as their mother tongue, although many Brahui speakers in Baluchistan understand themselves ethnically as Baluchi. A Baluch population of almost 7 percent seems to be a more realistic figure. In addition, the smaller part of the Baluchi living in Pakistan settle in the province of Balochistan (only about 5 million); Approx. 4 million live in Sindh, in Punjab - especially in the south and southwest - 7 million. Tribal thinking also plays an important role among the Baluch. Of the numerous tribes into which they are divided, the most important are the Bugti, Mari and Rind. Many of the biraderi - especially those who own land - along the Indus, in southern Punjab and in Sindh refer to a Pashtun or Baloch ancestry, which today is mainly expressed in the biraderi 's own name. This shows the ambivalence with which the lowland inhabitants view tribal societies: On the one hand, they reject the Pashtuns and Baluch as "uneducated", "wild" and "backwoods"; on the other hand, the warrior image of tribal societies is becoming positive seen; This is expressed, for example, in the fact that the Pashtun title khan is also often used in Punjab names - regardless of religious affiliation. This is intended to underline a special masculinity, sovereignty and heroism. In Balochistan, the ethnic minority of the Hazaras is relatively significant in numbers. Originally from Central Asia, they came from Afghanistan to Quetta and other parts of the country in the 19th century and then again in the 1980s. As a result of a sustained wave of violence against Hazaras (especially bomb attacks on mosques and busy squares) in Quetta in recent years, those who can afford it are moving abroad again, especially to Australia. About 100,000 Hazaras are said to have already turned their backs on Balochistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa there is also the Hazara region, the inhabitants of which have no connection with those in Quetta. The Hazara region is home to a considerable number of Hindko speakers in the five districts of Abbottabad, Haripur, Kohistan, Mansehra and Batagram. They make up the majority of the population here. In the course of the renaming of the province in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2010, the demand for an independent province of Hazara arose. Although the population of Azad Kashmir is only around 4 million (1998: 2.97 million) and the region should not actually be counted as part of Pakistan due to its political status, the identity of the Kashmiris as a group, especially in Punjab, plays a particularly important role in socio-economic terms an important role. Kashmiris are very dispersed outside of Azad Kashmir, but have a noticeable presence in the urban centers of Punjab, especially in Lahore. Many settled there as textile entrepreneurs before the division of British India and made a significant contribution to regional industrialization. They hardly speak Kashmiri any more, but instead speak Punjabi dialects; Urdu is also preferred as a language that allows social mobility. A movement for the recognition of Kashmiri in Pakistan could not set any noteworthy accents. As biraderi with endogamous marriage and family ties, the Kashmiris are a social force in cities like Lahore and Sialkot. There are many clans there who emphasize their Kashmiri origin. The family of politicians Nawaz and Shabaz Sharif (see box on page 97) also come from Kashmir. However, even with the use of the ethnonym «Kashmiri», the boundaries between external ethnic categorization efforts and the self-image as «Kashmiri biraderi» become blurred. After all, it depends strongly on the context and definition whether self-designations such as Kashmiri, Jat, Gujar etc. correspond more to biraderis or ethnic groups.