Why are minorities disproportionately affected by FGM

dish

REASONS FOR DECISION:

I. Procedure:

1. The complaining party, a female citizen of Somalia, applied for international protection in Austria on 02.03.2012.

2. In the initial questioning by the public security service on 03.03.2012, the complaining party stated to the extent essential that they came from Qoryooley, belonged to the Ashraf and were married. Her mother, husband and two brothers would still live in Somalia.

The complainant's reason for fleeing was that Qoryooley was governed by Al Shabaab. In January 2011, members of the militia came to their home, took everything away from them and beat everyone. Her husband had fled out the window; her father was shot and her husband has disappeared to this day.

3. When the authority concerned was questioned on March 27, 2012, the complaining party was questioned in detail about their alleged place of origin and about the Ashraf.

4. The authority in question then commissioned a language analysis with the company Sprakab, from whose report of 02.05.2012 it emerged that the linguistic background of the complaining party was with a very high degree of security in north-western Somalia. In a statement on this report dated May 21, 2012, it was stated that the complaining party did not agree with the result of the analysis.

6. With the contested decision, the authority in question rejected the complainant's application regarding the granting of the status of persons entitled to asylum in accordance with Section 3 (1) in conjunction with Section 2 (1) (13) AsylG (ruling point I.), recognized it in accordance with Section 8 Paragraph 1 AsylG granted the status of a person entitled to subsidiary protection (point II.) And issued a temporary residence permit (point III.).

After a summary of the course of the proceedings and the interrogations, the authority in question established that the complaining party came from Northern Somalia / Somaliland. It could not be established that the complaining party was or would have been subjected to persecution or threats by Al Shabaab or because of its clan membership.

7. A complaint was filed against point I. of the decision in good time.

8. The Federal Administrative Court commissioned the verification of the language analysis by the Verified institute, with the representation of the complaining party speaking out against language analyzes in general with an opinion dated November 10, 2015.

The language analysis report dated December 16, 2015 was based on the assumption that the complaining party came from the linguistic community in Qoryooley. Verified stated in the report that the person on the recording speaks Somali as their mother tongue. Phonological, morphological and syntax-related characteristics could not be brought into agreement with the linguistic community in Qoryooley. In summary, it is stated that the speech analysis shows with some probability that the language spoken on the recording probably does not correspond to the linguistic community of the original assumption.

9. With, finally, a letter dated February 8, 2016, the complaining party and the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum were invited to an oral hearing before the now competent Federal Administrative Court on March 22, 2016, accompanied by the report of the language analysis.

10. In a letter dated February 15, 2016, the authority concerned announced that it could not take part in the negotiation for official and personal reasons. The rejection of the complaint and the transmission of the minutes of the negotiations are requested.

A written statement by the representative of the complaining party dated March 18, 2016 on the analysis report by the Verified company criticized the method and the result of the analysis report.

11. On March 22nd, 2016 the Federal Administrative Court held an oral hearing in the presence of an interpreter for the Somali language and in the presence of the complaining party and its representative, in which the complaining party detailed according to their origin, their clan, their family, their reason for fleeing and their current fears were asked.

12. In a written statement by the representative of the complaining party on the country reports of May 17, 2016, it was stated in summary that these resulted in the prevalence of violence against women. FGM had also been carried out at the complaining party and uncircumcised women were stigmatized in Somali society. Enclosed was a patient letter from a hospital dated October 30, 2013, according to which curettage could not be performed in the event of a restrained miscarriage due to infibulation. Defibulation therefore had to be carried out first in order to be able to carry out a typical suction curettage afterwards. Also enclosed was a query response on Somalia from ACCORD regarding the situation of single women who had an FGM surgically reversed (23.09.2014, a-8847).

II. The Federal Administrative Court has considered:

1. Findings:

1.1. Regarding the complaining party:

1.1.1. The complaining party is a female citizen of Somalia who applied for international protection in Austria on March 2nd, 2012.

1.1.2. The origin of the complaining party from Qoryooley is not determined, but the legal assessment is assumed to be true (see VwGH, July 14, 2014, Ra 2014/20/0069).

A clan membership of the Ashraf is not established, but is also subject to the legal assessment as true (see VwGH, July 14, 2014, Ra 2014/20/0069).

1.1.3. The complaining party lives in a civil partnership with XXXX; the couple have one child together.

With today's decision on GZ. W211 1432721-2, XXXX was granted subsidiary protection status by the Federal Administrative Court.

1.2. The complaining party alleged that their home in Qoryooley was raided by Al Shabaab one night in January 2011. She, her mother, and her brothers ran away; her father was shot and her then husband fled another route. The family buried the father and then lived in another apartment for about two months before the complaining party left. This argument is not established, but the legal assessment is assumed to be true (see VwGH, July 14, 2014, Ra 2014/20/0069).

It is not established, however, that the complaining party was threatened with being taken away by Al Shabaab and forcibly married between January and March 2011, or it is not established that Al Shabaab himself or the messenger reportedly contacted and threatened the mother of the complaining party who to take the complaining party with him to marry her.

1.3. It is established that the complaining party had defibulation in 2013 in the course of a cautious miscarriage.

The mother of the complaining party now lives in Ethiopia; the whereabouts of the brothers of the complaining party is not known. Nothing is known of any other relatives in Qoryooley.

The mother and sisters of the Complainant Party's partner now live in Kenya; her partner no longer has a family in Somalia.

2. Country determinations on the situation in Somalia

The main findings from the state reports used by the Federal Administrative Court are reproduced below.

Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, State Documentation, Country Information Sheet Somalia, April 25, 2016, excerpts:

1. Security situation

The following comments must be taken into account with regard to the legibility of the map below. They were different

Actors in Somalia categorized:

Comments on the entries on the card:

* The map does not show an AMISOM garrison for Qoryooley. However, there is a base and troops available. However, these troops do not seem to keep the base permanently occupied. Therefore, Qoryooley is the only district capital controlled by AMISOM for which no garrison has been registered (although there is a garrison of the Somali army).

According to the analysis of the state documentation on the security situation in Somalia, also cited by EASO, the situation worsened in the period from 7/2014 to 6/2015 in the following districts: Dhusamareb and Ceel Buur (Galgaduud); Belet Weyne and Bulo Burte (Hiiraan); Wanla Weyne, Afgooye, Qoryooley, Merka and Baraawe (Lower Shabelle);

Baidoa and Burhakaba (Bay); Xudur, Waajid and Rab Dhuure (Bakool);

Bulo Xawo (Gedo); Kismayo (Lower Jubba). The situation in the following districts has improved over the same period: Ceel Waaq and Luuq (Gedo). No relevant changes have occurred in the other districts (BFA 10.2015; see EASO 2.2016).

Table cannot be shown

(EASO 2.2016).

There are serious differences in the numbers of violent acts between Northern and Southern / Central Somalia. This can be seen on the one hand in the distribution of terrorist activities in urban areas, on the other hand in the number of armed conflicts per district (BFA 10.2015).

Swell:

-

BFA - BFA State Documentation (10.2015): Analysis of Somalia:

Situation maps on the security situation, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1729_1445329638_soma-analyse-lagekarten-2015-10-12-endversion.pdf, accessed on 23.3.2016

-

EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2016): Somalia Security Situation,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1457606427_easo-somalia-security-feb-2016.pdf, accessed on March 22, 2016

1.1.1. Lower and Middle Shabelle

Lower Shabelle is severely affected by al Shabaab activities (EASO 2.2016; A 4.2016). Al Shabaab has sufficient capacities there to launch attacks on their enemies (A 4.2016). In numerous places and cities with garrisons from AMISOM and / or the army, there are attacks, targeted assassinations, hit-and-run attacks and major al Shabaab operations. Al Shabaab was able to temporarily gain control of places such as Aw Dheegle, Mubarak, Janaale (EASO 2.2016) and Leego, but also of the city of Qoryooley. Qoryooley and Leego were occupied by AMISOM again after a short period of time (UNSC 9/11/2015). After a reorganization of AMISOM in the area, the places Ceel Saliini, Cambarey, Golweyne and Busley as well as the district capital Kurtunwarey were cleared by AMISOM. Al Shabaab immediately occupied all of these places (UNSC 1/8/2016). The district capital, Wanla Weyn, also remained unmanned for days by the AMISOM (albeit with one from the Somali army) (BFA 10.2015).

Al Shabaab has a covert presence throughout the region (EASO 2.2016).

In addition, clan battles for land and resources took place in Lower Shabelle (EASO 2.2016). The conflict between Biyomaal and Habr Gedir remains unsolved, even if the number of reports of kidnappings and killings is decreasing (USDOS April 13, 2016). The Biyomaal and Tunni militias are allegedly allied with al Shabaab. The cities of Merka and Afgooye are particularly affected by clan conflicts (EASO 2.2016).

Larger AMISOM garrisons are in Bali Doogle, Afgooye, Merka, Shalambood and Baraawe (Lower Shabelle); as well as in Balcad, Jowhar, Warsheikh and Cadale (Middle Shabelle). AMISOM also has other positions and positions along the supply routes. There are also numerous roadblocks along the routes, many of them illegal. The Somali security forces are taking action against such bans (EASO 2.2016). Due to a reorganization, AMISOM has evacuated the place Fidow (Middle Shabelle), al Shabaab has occupied the place immediately (UNSC 8.1.2016).

There were repeated clan battles in Middle Shabelle, e.g. in Jowhar (8/2014), Rage Ceele (6/2015) and Warsheikh (6/2015 and 7/2015). Conflicts over resources preoccupy the Abgal and Shiidle militias; there are also intra-Abgal fights (EASO 2.2016).

The capital of the Middle Shabelle region, Jowhar, was liberated by AMISOM and Somalia troops in late 2012. The number of incidents of violence grew steadily and reached its peak in the quarters Q2 2013 - Q2 2014 (11 incidents per quarter). Since then the situation has improved significantly, in the quarters Q3 2014 - Q2 2015 there were an average of 3 incidents per quarter (BFA 10.2015).

Swell:

-

A - Security Analysis Department (4.2016): Security Report for March 2016

-

BFA - BFA State Documentation (10.2015): Analysis of Somalia:

Situation maps on the security situation, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1729_1445329638_soma-analyse-lagekarten-2015-10-12-endversion.pdf, accessed on 23.3.2016

-

EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2016): Somalia Security Situation,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1457606427_easo-somalia-security-feb-2016.pdf, accessed on March 22, 2016

-

UNSC - UN Security Council (8.1.2016): Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1453284910_n1600065.pdf, accessed on 1.4.2016

-

UNSC - UN Security Council (11.9.2015): Report of the Secretary - General on Somalia,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1443010894_n1527126.pdf, accessed on March 23, 2016

-

USDOS - US Department of State (April 13, 2016): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Somalia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid= 252727, accessed April 14, 2016

1.1.2. Al Shabaab (AS)

The aim of al Shabaab is to drive the Somali government and its allies out of Somalia and to install an Islamic regime in Greater Somalia. In addition, al Shabaab is also pursuing an agenda of global jihad and attacking targets abroad (EASO 2.2016).

Under international law, the al Shabaab, as a de facto regime, have duties to protect the population in the areas they control in accordance with the 2nd Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AA 1.12.2015). State protection is not available in the areas of al Shabaab (UKHO 03/15/2016).

Since 2011, the military capacities of the al Shabaab have been decimated considerably by AMISOM and Somali forces as well as by internal disputes (UKHO March 15, 2016). Al Shabaab has suffered severe defeats in the recent past. On the one hand, the leader, Ahmed Godane, was eliminated by a US drone in September 2014. On the other hand, after losing the important port city of Baraawe in October 2014, al Shabaab also lost other strategically important cities (EASO 2.2016). Lastly, severe losses were also inflicted on al Shabaab. In an air strike against a terrorist camp in Raso (Hiiraan) alone, more than 150 newly trained fighters were killed and numerous others injured. An additional 115 al Shabaab fighters were killed and 110 imprisoned in an advance by al Shabaab along the coast in Nugaal. In a similar advance in the hinterland, GIA forces inflicted similar losses on al Shabaab. In March 2016 alone, al Shabaab lost at least 500 men, and another 210 were imprisoned (A 4.2016). Despite the losses, al Shabaab is still able to hold large parts of the rural area in southern / central Somalia (EASO 2.2016; see AI 24.2.2016). The group also controls supply routes (UKHO 03/15/2016). It is not exactly known how many fighters al Shabaab has. It is unlikely that the militia had more than 6,000 men (EASO 2.2016). In any case, Al Shabaab is still a long way from being defeated (BS 2016).

However, in mid-2015, the first cracks developed within the al Shabaab with regard to a reorientation towards the Islamic State (IS). Several ISIS sympathizers were arrested; there were also armed clashes (EASO 2.2016; see AI 24.2.2016, UNSC 8.1.2016).

The people in the field of al Shabaab are subject to a highly authoritarian and repressive rule. While this helps to strengthen security on the one hand (less crime and violence by clan militias) (BS 2016), al Shabaab tries to control all aspects of people's public and private life (BS 2016; cf. DIS 9.2015). All residents of the areas of al Shabaab must follow strict regulations, such as: B. clothing, marriage, tax payment, participation in military operations, shaving, spying, education, etc. (DIS 9.2015). With the associated harsh punishments, a general climate of fear was created (BS 2016). Breaking regulations can lead to severe penalties and even death (DIS 9.2015).

Swell:

-

A - Security Analysis Department (4.2016): Security Report for March 2016

-

AA - Federal Foreign Office (1.12.2015): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

-

AI - Amnesty International (February 24, 2016): Amnesty International Report 2015/16 - The State of the World's Human Rights - Somalia, http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/319738/445108_en.html, accessed March 22, 2016

-

BS - Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016): BTI 2016 - Somalia Country Report,

https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Somalia.pdf, accessed on March 24, 2016

-

DIS - Danish Immigration Service (9.2015): Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process; Report from the Danish Immigration Service's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia; 2-12 May 2015, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1443181235_somalia-ffm-report-2015.pdf, accessed on April 4, 2016

-

EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2016): Somalia Security Situation,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1457606427_easo-somalia-security-feb-2016.pdf, accessed on March 22, 2016

-

UKHO - UK Home Office (15.3.2016): Country Information and Guidance South and Central Somalia -Fear of Al-Shabaab, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1458121464_som-cig-fear-of-al-shabaab. pdf, accessed on March 22, 2016

-

UNSC - UN Security Council (8.1.2016): Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1453284910_n1600065.pdf, accessed on 1.4.2016

2. Minorities and clans

2.1. Population structure and clan protection

More than 85% of the population share an ethnic origin (USDOS April 13, 2016). However, the Somali population is only homogeneous at first glance (EASO 8/2014). All over Somalia there is a fragmentation into numerous clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans, whose membership is determined by family relationships or traditional feelings of belonging (AA 1.12.2015; cf. ÖB 10.2015). In fact, the clans form a kind of sub-ethnicity. The clans also form the basis of the identity of a Somali, everyone usually knows their exact position in the clan system. This also applies to the urbanized population. When Somali describe their origins, they usually start with themselves and then climb the hierarchical levels of the system up to the clan family. This list is called abtirsiimo or abtirsiin, and children between the ages of eight and nine usually know it by heart (EASO 8/2014).

The main clan families are the traditionally nomadic Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq as well as the sedentary Digil and Mirifle / Rahanweyn. These clan families are further subdivided into the levels of clans, sub (sub) clans, lineages and the most important level of the mag / diya (blood money / compensation) from a social point of view among the nomadic clans, who pay for crimes of individuals against traditional law ( xeer) takes responsibility. Traditionally, this group also provides support for relatives in difficult (financial) situations. Only in Mogadishu has the system eroded to such an extent that the mag / diya group no longer provides support, but only the core family (EASO 8/2014).

The clans are political actors who usually have their own territory. Traditional contracts (xeer) are mostly concluded between Mag / Diya paying groups. However, the clan system - as mentioned - is not an exact science, coalitions and delimitations - even geographical ones - are difficult to grasp or not precisely defined at all (EASO 8/2014).

The clan system is dynamic and complex. Due to the civil war and the associated migration, but also due to the population growth, increasing fluctuations were recorded after 1991. Records of genealogies are controversial (EASO 8/2014).

* The Darod are divided into the large groups Ogadeni (Ethiopia and Jubba regions), Marehan (southern / central Somalia) and Harti. The latter are a federation of Majerteen (main clan in Puntland), Dulbahante and Warsangeli (Sool and Sanaag regions).

* The Hawiye live mainly in southern / central Somalia, the most important subclans are Abgaal and Habr Gedir.

* The Dir can be found in western Somaliland and in some areas of southern / central Somalia. Their main clans are Issa and Gadabursi (both Somaliland) and Biyomaal (southern Somalia).

* The Isaaq are the main clan of Somaliland.

* The Digil and Mirifle / Rahanweyn live in the fertile valleys of Shabelle and Jubba and in the area between the two rivers (especially the Bay and Bakool) (EASO 8/2014).

In addition, there are some ethnic minorities and class professional castes in Somalia, which make up between 15 and 30 percent of the population (EASO 8/2014). Minority groups include the Bantu (largest group), Benadiri, Reer Xamar, Bravanese, Swahili, Tumal, Yibir, Yaxar, Madhiban, Hawrarsame, Muse Dheryo, Faqayaqub and Gabooye (USDOS April 13, 2016). Minority clans or professional castes can enter into a dependency relationship (shegaat) with large clans and are then - in external matters - considered part of the large clan. Long-term alliances between smaller and larger clans are concluded according to traditional law (xeer). Both constructions also include the protection of the smaller partner by the larger one (EASO 8/2014).

The Ashraf and the Sheikhal are known as religious clans. The Ashraf derive their religious status from the descent they claim to be the daughter of the Prophet; the Sheikhal from an inherited religious status (EASO 8/2014).

The Ashraf and Sheikhal are traditionally respected and protected by the clans with whom they live. The Sheikhal are also closely associated with the Hawiye / Hirab clan and even have some Hawiye seats in the Somali parliament. Some of the Ashraf live as part of the Benadiri in the coastal cities, some as the Digil / Mirifle clan in the river valleys of Bay and Bakool (EASO 8/2014).

Clan protection means the threat of violence in the event of aggression against a member by an outsider. The possibility of maintaining this threat is just as essential as the possibility of avoiding an act of revenge by jointly paying compensation (mag / diya). Generally - but not everywhere - clan protection works better than protection by the state or the police. Accordingly, many people turn to the clan rather than the police for violent crimes. However, clan protection is used at a very low level in the clan hierarchy. In Mogadishu, for example, it is not enough to belong to the Hawiye in order to receive clan protection. Belonging to a dominant sub (sub) clan of the Hawiye in Mogadishu is more relevant (EASO 8/2014).

To what extent clan protection still works today is controversial. Factors such as AMISOM, the restoration of state security agencies or al Shabaab have eroded the protection. On the other hand, the withdrawal of al Shabaab and the lack of state administration in rural areas have increased clan protection. The extent of clan protection varies regionally and is subject to changes over time. In Somaliland and Puntland, where there is relative stability, clan protection is less relevant than in southern / central Somalia. In Mogadishu, on the other hand, elders are still involved in mediating conflicts, but there is no longer any risk of persecution due to clan membership. It is no longer the clans, but AMISOM, the army and the police who are responsible for security. However, it must be taken into account that parts of the army and police are still closely related to their clans of origin (EASO 8/2014).

Swell:

-

AA - Federal Foreign Office (1.12.2015): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

-

EASO - European Asylum Support Office (8.2014): South and Central Somalia: Country Overview,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1412334993_easo-2014-08-coi-report-somalia.pdf, accessed April 14, 2016

-

ÖIF - Austrian Integration Fund / BAA State Documentation / Andreas Tiwald (12.2010): The Parias of Somalia:

Professional box as a basis for social discrimination, http://www.integrationsfonds.at/fileadmin/content/AT/Downloads/Publikationen/n8_Laenderinfo_Somalia.pdf, accessed April 21, 2016

-

USDOS - US Department of State (April 13, 2016): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Somalia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid= 252727, accessed April 14, 2016

2.2. Current situation

Both the Somali and the Punish constitution are committed to the principle of non-discrimination (AA 1.12.2015). In principle, when the federal government was formed at the end of 2012 and during the last comprehensive government restructuring, attention was paid to the broadest possible composition of all clans and sub-clans. Both government and parliament are organized according to the so-called "4.5 solution", which means that for every seat held by a representative of the large clans in government or parliament, half a seat is given to a representative of the smaller clans (ÖB 10.2015) or To minority clans (USDOS 13.4.2016). So the clans remained the determining factor in Somali and Somaliland politics. No state can be built against or without them. The four largest clans (Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Digil-Mirifle) dominate administration, politics and society, each with 61 seats in parliament. Accordingly, the local administrations and the national parliament are organized around the various clans or sub-clans (ÖB 10.2015). The 4.5 formula has already been broken in favor of the minorities (USDOS April 13, 2016).

In most areas, the dominant clan excludes other groups from effectively participating in government institutions (USDOS April 13, 2016). In the areas controlled by the government, discrimination in the light of the respective clan or sub-clan membership can be assumed (AA 1.12.2015).

This can be economic discrimination, for example in the context of state procurement procedures, but also discrimination in access to food aid, natural resources, health services or other state services (AA 1.12.2015) or legal proceedings (USDOS 13.4.2016). Members of a (sub) clan can also encounter considerable difficulties in areas dominated by another (sub) clan, especially in conflict situations regarding accidents, property or water (AA 1.12.2015). It can be assumed that state protection does not apply in the event of clan conflicts, but that the "regulation" of these conflicts is basically left to the clans themselves. The state security forces are usually too weak to be able to intervene effectively in clan conflicts; In addition, the federal government is probably unwilling to interfere in conflicts of this kind and thus attract the unwillingness of individual clans (ÖB 10.2015).

Many minority communities suffer from numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion (USDOS April 13, 2016). Bantu are discriminated against because of their ethnicity (UNHRC 10/28/2015). Individual other minorities (including Jareer, Benadiri, Midgan, Gabooye) also live under particularly difficult social conditions and, as they are not integrated into the clan structures, see themselves in many ways from the rest of the population - but not systematically from government agencies - economically, politically and socially excluded (AA 1.12.2015; cf. ÖB 10.2015). Many minority communities live in deep poverty. They are also disproportionately affected by the violence prevailing in the country (killings, torture, rape, etc.) (USDOS April 13, 2016). However, the last - unconfirmed - reports of repression in the narrower sense of the word date back to November 2013, when state security forces of the Hawiye clan allegedly evicted sedentary Bantu farmers from their properties (AA 1.12.2015). The reports used here do not give current examples of violent repression or the persecution of minorities.

The extent of discrimination depends on the minority:

Vocational castes are generally more exposed to more discrimination than ethnic minorities. Most of them live in ghetto-like quarters or city districts (EASO 8/2014; cf. ÖIF 12.2010). Mixed marriages - especially between professional castes and the main clans - are traditionally restricted (USDOS April 13, 2016; see EASO 8.2014, ÖB 10.2015). However, this taboo seems to have been softened somewhat in recent years (EASO 8/2014). Relationships that do not correspond to the classic structures are more common. Marriages in which the woman belongs to a main clan and the husband to a minority are very rare (C 18.6.2014).

There are also regional differences in other areas: while Mogadishu, for example, is rather tolerant due to its mix, there is a clear separation in Puntland and in some areas members of minorities are not allowed to live in the cities (B 10/14/2014).

There are no more clan fights or conflicts in Mogadishu today. There is also no risk of severe discrimination based on clan membership. Since there are no longer any clan militias in the city, the clan is less a protective structure than a social structure. Members of the minority are no longer marginalized or harassed because of their affiliation. The security situation for members of small, weak clans or ethnic minorities has improved significantly. The hint by UNHCR that the presence of the nuclear family is relevant for a return to Mogadishu points to the now minor importance of the clan (UKUT October 3, 2014; cf. UKUT November 5, 2015). In addition, there are no physical characteristics that indicate belonging to a particular clan. Therefore, the people in Mogadishu and other large cities do not automatically know which clan a person belongs to (LI 04/04/2016).

Some minorities have benefited from al Shabaab and supported the group. With the loss of power for al Shabaab, there are also cases where this previous support now has negative effects (EASO 8/2014). For example, a disproportionately large number of members of minorities were or are involved in the execution of corporal punishment and executions as well as in the perpetration of targeted attacks. There is a risk of revenge actions (B 10.2014). With al Shabaab it generally applies that those clans that are considered to be directed against al Shabaab have to reckon with more problems - be it e.g. higher taxation; economic isolation; or looting (EASO 8/2014).

Swell:

-

AA - Federal Foreign Office (1.12.2015): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

-

B - Expert B (10.2014): This expert works in Mogadishu.

-

C - Expert C (June 18, 2014): This expert has been working on Somalia for several years.

-

LI - Landinfo (04/04/2016): Somalia: Praktiske forhold og sikkerhetsutfordringer knyttet til reisevirksomhet i Sør-Somalia, http://www.landinfo.no/asset/3331/1/3331_1.pdf, accessed 04/04/2016

-

ÖB - Austrian Embassy Nairobi (10.2015):

Asylum Country Report Somalia,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1729_1445329855_soma-oeb-bericht-2015-10.pdf, accessed on February 25, 2016

-

UKUT - United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (5.11.2015): AAW (expert evidence - weight) Somalia v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2015] UKUT 00673 (IAC), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5669ccf64.html, accessed 7.4.2016

-

UKUT - United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (October 3, 2014): UK Country Guidance Case. MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) (Rev 1) (CG) [2014] UKUT 442 (IAC), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/IAC/2014/[2014 Autovermietung_UKUT_442_iac.html , Accessed April 7, 2016

-

UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council (28.10.2015): Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Bahame Tom Nyanduga,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1451399567_a-hrc-30-57-en.docx, accessed on March 23, 2016

-

USDOS - US Department of State (April 13, 2016): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Somalia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid= 252727, accessed April 14, 2016

3. Women

The current constitution particularly emphasizes the role and human rights of women and girls and the responsibility of the state in this regard. In fact, their situation is still particularly precarious. Women and girls remain exposed to the particular dangers of rape, kidnapping and systematic sexual slavery. Effective protection against such attacks, especially in the camps of internally displaced persons, has not yet been guaranteed due to a lack of state authority (AA 1.12.2015).

With the support of the EU delegation for Somalia, the Somali government has adopted an action plan to combat sexual assault, but implementation is very slow (ÖB 10.2015).

Even if violence against women is prohibited in the constitution (USDOS 13.4.2016), domestic violence against women remains a major problem (USDOS 13.4.2016; cf. AA 1.12.2015).

According to reports by the UN and international NGOs, violence against women - especially sexual violence - is widespread throughout the region (ÖB 10.2015; see UNHRC 28.10.2015). IDPs in refugee camps, especially in Mogadishu, are particularly affected by this (ÖB 10.2015; see UNHRC October 28, 2015; USDOS April 13, 2016). Minority women and girls are also often victims of rape. Due to the stigmatization of victims associated with rape, there is a high number of unreported cases (UNHRC October 28, 2015; cf. UKHO 3.2.2015; USDOS April 13, 2016). The perpetrators are armed men, including government soldiers, militiamen (HRW January 27, 2016; see UNHRC October 28, 2015; USDOS April 13, 2016), police officers and members of the al Shabaab (UNHRC October 28, 2015).

There are reports that suggest that sexual violence is deliberately used by the al Shabaab as a tactic in armed conflict (AA 1.12.2015).

Rape is forbidden by law (AA 1.12.2015; cf. ÖB 10.2015), the threat of punishment is 5-15 years, before military courts also death (USDOS 13.4.2016). With regard to gender-based violence, however, there is largely impunity. Prosecution or convictions for rape or other forms of sexual violence are rare in Somalia (UKHO 3.2.2015; see AA 1.12.2015; ÖB 10.2015; USDOS 13.4.2016). The criminal justice system is incompetent (UNHRC 10/28/2015).Sometimes the police ask the victims to carry out the investigations themselves (search for witnesses, localize the guilty party) (USDOS April 13, 2016; cf. UKHO 3.2.2015).

On the other hand, the military justice system has already sentenced some army soldiers to long prison terms or to death for rape (UNHRC October 28, 2015). Most rape or sexual assaults are dealt with in traditional courts, which either agree to a compensation payment or force a marriage between the victim and the perpetrator (UNHRC October 28, 2015; see USDOS April 13, 2016). State protection cannot be assumed (ÖB 10.2015; cf. UKHO 3.2.2015), for the most vulnerable cases it does not exist (HRW 27.1.2016).

The basis for a marriage is the Sharia, polygamy and divorce are therefore allowed (ÖB 10.2015). The transitional constitution does not set a minimum age for marriage. Child marriage is widespread. In rural areas, parents sometimes marry their daughters off at the age of twelve. Overall, 45 percent of women between the ages of 20 and 24 were married at the age of 18, and 8 percent at the age of 15. In rural areas, 12-year-old girls are also married (USDOS 13.4.2016).

Forced marriages are widespread (ÖB 10.2015). Forced marriages by al Shabaab usually only occur where the group has control (C 18.6.2014; see USDOS 13.4.2016; UKHO 3.2.2015; DIS 9.2015). There women and girls are exposed to a serious risk of being kidnapped, raped and forced into marriage by al Shabaab (UKHO 3.2.2015; see USDOS 13.4.2016). Refusal can mean death for the girl or her family (DIS 9.2015; cf. NOAS 4.2014). There have been no reports of forced marriages with al Shabaab fighters from cities controlled by AMISOM and the Somali Army; but there are reports of related threats via SMS (DIS 9.2015). On the other hand, members of armed militias and clan militias also force girls to marry (UNHRC October 28, 2015).

Sometimes kidnapped women and girls also have to work as cleaners, cooks or porters for al Shabaab. In some cases girls were used as suicide bombers (UKHO 3.2.2015).

In the course of applying Sharia law as well as applying traditional law, women are not involved in the decision-making process (USDOS April 13, 2016). In addition, the rules of civil and criminal law interpreted from Sharia apply, which tend to discriminate against women or follow an (exaggerated) paternalistic approach. Accordingly, different legal standards apply to women than to men. For example, women only receive 50% of the male inheritance quota (AA 1.12.2015; see USDOS 13.4.2016). In the case of the killing of a woman, only half of the "blood money" to be paid to the victim's family is provided for compared to the killing of a man. Adult women and many underage girls are forced to marry (AA 1.12.2015). Overall, there is no alternative to the fundamentally discriminatory interpretations of the civil and criminal law elements of the Sharia, the rules of civil and criminal law interpreted from the Sharia also apply in Puntland and Somaliland. Nevertheless, there are political approaches that aim to bring the status of men and women closer together in the medium to long term. In the areas controlled by al Shabaab, the rules of Sharia law are applied in an extreme way - with the corresponding further discrimination against women as a result (AA 1.12.2015).

In the shrinking areas controlled by al Shabaab, there is a strict and harsh interpretation of Sharia law. Many rules apply to women: full veil; Work ban; Prohibition of traveling with unrelated men, etc. Failure to comply with the rules can result in severe punishment (UKHO 3.2.2015).

Women are not adequately involved in political decision-making processes (UNHRC October 28, 2015). Actually, 30% of the seats in parliament would be for women. However, these only make up 14 out of 275 MPs. There are three women in the 26-member government (USDOS April 13, 2016). In the regional assembly of the Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA) 8 out of 64 MPs are women (UNSC 9/11/2015). There has never been a woman in the council of elders in Puntland, there are two in the 66-seat House of Representatives, and there are also two women ministers (USDOS April 13, 2016).

In general, women do not have the same rights as men and they are systematically treated with lower priority (USDOS 13.4.2016). Women suffer from severe exclusion and inequality in many areas, most notably; Health, employment and labor market participation (ÖB 10.2015), lending, education and accommodation (USDOS 13.4.2016). According to a 2010 report by a Somali women's organization, only 25% of women owned cattle, land or other property there (USDOS April 13, 2016).

Swell:

-

AA - Federal Foreign Office (1.12.2015): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

-

C - Expert C (June 18, 2014): This expert has been working on Somalia for several years.

-

DIS - Danish Immigration Service (9.2015): Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process; Report from the Danish Immigration Service's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia; 2-12 May 2015, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1443181235_somalia-ffm-report-2015.pdf, accessed on April 4, 2016

-

ECHR - European Court of Human Rights (10.9.2015):

R.H. v. Sweden, Application no. 4601/14, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, http://www.refworld.org/docid/55f66ef04.html, accessed 7.4.2015

-

HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 27, 2016): World Report 2016 - Somalia, http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/318350/443530_en.html, accessed March 22, 2016

-

NOAS - Norwegian (4.2014): Persecution and protection in Somalia,

A fact-finding report by NOAS,

http://www.noas.no/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Somalia_web.pdf, accessed April 14, 2016

-

ÖB - Austrian Embassy Nairobi (10.2015):

Asylum Country Report Somalia,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1729_1445329855_soma-oeb-bericht-2015-10.pdf, accessed on February 25, 2016

-

UKHO - UK Home Office (3.2.2015): Country Information and Guidance

-

Somalia: Women fearing gender-based harm / violence, http://www.refworld.org/docid/54d1daef4.html, accessed on April 14, 2016

-

UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council (28.10.2015): Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Bahame Tom Nyanduga,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1451399567_a-hrc-30-57-en.docx, accessed on March 23, 2016

-

UNSC - UN Security Council (11.9.2015): Report of the Secretary - General on Somalia,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1443010894_n1527126.pdf, accessed on March 23, 2016

-

USDOS - US Department of State (April 13, 2016): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Somalia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid= 252727, accessed April 14, 2016

3.1. Female genital mutilation (FGM)

The transitional constitution prohibits female genital mutilation (FGM) (USDOS June 25, 2015), but this is widespread in Somalia (USDOS April 13, 2016; see LI June 11, 2015; AA 1.12.2015). More than 90% of all girls are affected (LI June 11, 2015; see UNHRC October 28, 2015). As a rule, girls between the ages of ten and 13 suffer from FGM (AA 1.12.2015); According to other sources, more than 80% of the cases are mutilated between the ages of five and nine; 10% between nine and fourteen years of age; and at 7% between zero and four years (EASO 8/2014). According to yet different information, the mutilation was carried out in 80% of the girls between the ages of five and 14 years (USDOS April 13, 2016). Sources in the latest Danish Immigration Service (DIS) report again state that the vast majority will be mutilated before their eighth birthday. A DIS source stated that girls who have reached puberty are no longer circumcised. This would be too risky for health. Once a girl has reached puberty, the pressure from relatives also disappears (DIS 1.2016).

63% of the circumcised suffered the most extensive form (pharaonic circumcision / infibulation / WHO type III) (EASO 8/2014). Another source estimates the number of infibulations at 80% (DIS 1.2016). The resulting health problems of those affected are widespread. Many do not survive the mutilation (AA 1.12.2015).

In the Bendiri and the Arab communities in Somalia, it is not the infibulation but the Sunna (WHO types I and II) that is widespread. In these groups, circumcision seems to take place at birth, possibly only as a symbolic cut. In other parts of Somalia, too, the sunna is increasingly used (DIS 1.2016).

Nationwide, governments are trying to restrict this practice (AA 1.12.2015). UNICEF is working with the Somali government, Puntland and other actors to mobilize people against FGM and to eradicate the practice (UNHRC 10/28/2015). FGM is banned in Puntland and there are signs of a reduction. According to a study by UNICEF in collaboration with the governments of Somaliland and Puntland, FGM affects 25% of girls between the ages of 1-14 in northern Somalia. In contrast, it is 99% for those over 15 years of age (UKHO 3.2.2015).

FGM is prohibited in the areas of al Shabaab (LIFOS 01/24/2014). The group al Islah and other Islamists are also campaigning against FGM (C June 18, 2014). However, there are no authorities or organizations for mothers that offer support or protection with regard to the prevention of FGM (DIS 1.2016).

In order to avoid mutilation, the mother's steadfastness is essential. Educational background, social status and cultural and geographical affiliation also play a role. There are parents in both urban and rural areas who do not allow their daughters to be mutilated. However, it is easier in the cities, where anonymity is more likely or the close social interaction is less (DIS 1.2016).

In general, a mother who does not want her daughter to be circumcised will encounter significant problems in rural areas. In urban areas, too, there can be great social (LIFOS 24.1.2014) and psychological pressure so that the daughter is circumcised. The psychological pressure can also take extreme forms, but such cases are exceptional. If the child's father also speaks out against mutilation, and if it persists, it is easier to withstand the psychological pressure (DIS 1.2016).

The possibility that girls are subjected to FGM by relatives without the mother's consent cannot be ruled out, but it is unlikely. No source from the Danish Immigration Service could report such a case. Without the mother's knowledge, FGM cannot take place due to the health consequences (DIS 1.2016).

Uncircumcised women are socially stigmatized in Somali society (EASO 8/2014). However, there are no physical examinations to determine the status of a completed mutilation in a girl. This also applies to returnees from the west. Rural areas are likely to find out more quickly that a girl is not mutilated. One possibility is for a mother to pretend that her daughter has been subjected to a Sunna (DIS 1.2016).

Swell:

-

AA - Federal Foreign Office (1.12.2015): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

-

C - Expert C (June 18, 2014): This expert has been working on Somalia for several years.

-

DIS - Danish Immigration Service (1.2016): South Central Somalia - Female Genital Mutilation / Cutting, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1455786226_fgmnotat2016.pdf, accessed on April 4, 2016

-

EASO - European Asylum Support Office (8.2014): South and Central Somalia: Country Overview,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1412334993_easo-2014-08-coi-report-somalia.pdf, accessed April 14, 2016

-

LI - Landinfo (June 11, 2015): Barn og unge, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1436864948_3151-1.pdf, accessed on April 4, 2016

-

LIFOS - Lifos / Migrationsverket (24.1.2014): Kvinnor i Somalia. Report från utredningsresa till Nairobi, Kenya i october 2013, http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=31539, accessed on 04/04/2016

-

UKHO - UK Home Office (3.2.2015): Country Information and Guidance

-

Somalia: Women fearing gender-based harm / violence, http://www.refworld.org/docid/54d1daef4.html, accessed on April 14, 2016

-

UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council (28.10.2015): Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Bahame Tom Nyanduga,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1451399567_a-hrc-30-57-en.docx, accessed on March 23, 2016

-

USDOS - US Department of State (April 13, 2016): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Somalia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid= 252727, accessed April 14, 2016

4. Subjects of targeted attacks by al Shabaab

In areas controlled by al Shabaab, government support and statements against al Shabaab are considered sufficient to be convicted and executed as traitors. Supporters of state structures or employees of aid organizations are defined as a military target and released for assassination accordingly (AA 1.12.2015). Blockade breakers (HRW January 27, 2016) and village elders in villages near AMISOM / government cities were also killed (DIS 9/2015). There are several reports that al Shabaab charged people on suspicion of espionage and publicly executed them within hours of the verdict being pronounced (UNHRC October 28, 2015; see USDOS April 13, 2016, HRW January 27, 2016).

In addition to military targets of the al Shabaab, such as AMISOM and Somali security forces, certain civilian targets are also mentioned, which are attacked on the territory of AMISOM and the Somali government. This includes the Somali government (DIS 9.2015; cf. UKHO 15.3.2016, HRW 27.1.2016); Civilians associated with the government; Employees of humanitarian NGOs; UN employees (USDOS April 13, 2016; cf. UKHO March 15, 2016) or persons and institutions that represent the international community; international NGOs (DIS 9.2015; see UKHO 15.3.2016); diplomatic missions; prominent peace activists, community leaders, clan elders and their relatives (USDOS April 13, 2016; cf. HRW January 27, 2016); as well as journalists (UKHO March 15, 2016; see HRW January 27, 2016) and clerics (HRW January 27, 2016). Educational institutions and people who refuse to pay zakat (tax) to al Shabaab are also named as targets (DIS 9.2015). Targeted attacks on these groups of people have occurred primarily in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Belet Weyne (HRW January 27, 2016).

In Mogadishu, for example, there are regular attacks on civilians and civil structures (HRW January 27, 2016). However, not all civilians are equally affected. In general, a "normal civilian" (no connection to the government; to the security forces; to the authorities; to NGOs or international organizations) is not exposed to such a risk - even when returning to Mogadishu - that this requires protection in accordance with Article 3 or Article 15c (UKUT October 3, 2014; see ECHR September 10, 2015). In the course of attacks by al Shabaab on targets in inhabited areas (using explosives or hand grenades), however, "normal civilians" are also injured or killed. Civilians as such are not the specific target of al Shabaab (DIS 9.2015). The mere fact that a person lives in a city in southern / central Somalia does not increase the risk of persecution or the risk of serious harm from the al Shabaab (UKHO 03/15/2016). There is no specific category of "civilians" or those who have returned from the diaspora when it comes to the strategic target selection of the al Shabaab (UKUT October 3, 2014).

For people living in an urban area controlled by AMISOM and / or the government; and which are not affiliated with, or believed to support, the government or the international community; it is unlikely that they will be of interest to al Shabaab (UKHO 3/15/2016).

Even "low level" goals (e.g. local employees of international or national NGOs) are not a priority of al Shabaab. However, if no "high profile" targets (e.g. AMISOM, UN) are available, then "low level" targets could be attacked as an alternative (UKHO 15.3.2016; cf. DIS 9.2015).

Several Landinfo sources mention an increased risk for AMISOM's local employees. On the other hand, numerous employees pour into AMISOM's secure zone every morning. A source said few were killed by al Shabaab, with most living in relative safety near the airport. Overall, the situation for local UN employees appears to be similar (LI 2.6.2015). There are only a few documented cases where al Shabaab attacked local UN employees (DIS 9/2015). Between May 2014 and February 2015, at least four of the approximately 2,000 local employees working directly and indirectly for the UN were murdered by al Shabaab (LI 2.6.2015). Local UN employees, however, fear attacks by al Shabaab. They take precautions to avoid being associated with the UN (DIS 9.2015).

Landinfo has asked some sources about work for other international organizations and NGOs. Special security measures are imposed on local employees.they take safety precautions themselves (LI 2.6.2015). There are sometimes threats by telephone (LI 2.6.2015; cf. DIS 9.2015). None of the sources consulted stated that an al Shabaab employee was murdered. In two incidents (2011 and 2013), local employees of al Shabaab were arrested and only released after mediation by clan elders. Some employees are forced to cooperate (with regard to clarification) by al Shabaab; there are also threats with regard to the killing of family members (LI 2.6.2015).

According to UNOCHA, attacks and threats against employees of humanitarian organizations are becoming more common. There were 60 incidents in the first five months of 2015 (UNHRC October 28, 2015). There seem to be only a few attacks (DIS 9.2015). Based on the information available, Landinfo does not assume that the killing of local employees of AMISOM, UN or other international organizations are a priority for al Shabaab (LI 2.6.2015).

Some national NGOs appear to pay a tax to al Shabaab. In addition, al Shabaab currently seems to focus on high-level goals (e.g. AMISOM, government, UN) (DIS 9.2015). In addition, al Shabaab wants to prevent the systematic killing of civilians who have little or no connection with AMISOM, the government, the UN or NGOs (e.g. tea sellers), since such murders are very unpopular (DIS 9.2015; cf. EASO 2.2016) .

Swell:

-

AA - Federal Foreign Office (1.12.2015): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

-

DIS - Danish Immigration Service (9.2015): Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process; Report from the Danish Immigration Service's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia; 2-12 May 2015, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1443181235_somalia-ffm-report-2015.pdf, accessed on April 4, 2016

-

EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2016): Somalia Security Situation,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1457606427_easo-somalia-security-feb-2016.pdf, accessed on March 22, 2016

-

ECHR - European Court of Human Rights (10.9.2015):

R.H. v. Sweden, Application no. 4601/14, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, http://www.refworld.org/docid/55f66ef04.html, accessed 7.4.2015

-

HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 27, 2016): World Report 2016 - Somalia, http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/318350/443530_en.html, accessed March 22, 2016

-

LI - Landinfo (2.6.2015): Somalia: Al-Shabaab og lokalt ansatte i AMISOM, FN og other internasjonale organisasjoner http://www.landinfo.no/asset/3159/1/3159_1.pdf, accessed 6.4.2016

-

UKHO - UK Home Office (15.3.2016): Country Information and Guidance South and Central Somalia -Fear of Al-Shabaab, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1458121464_som-cig-fear-of-al-shabaab. pdf, accessed on March 22, 2016

-

UKUT - United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (October 3, 2014): UK Country Guidance Case. MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) (Rev 1) (CG) [2014] UKUT 442 (IAC), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/IAC/2014/[2014 Autovermietung_UKUT_442_iac.html , Accessed April 7, 2016

-

UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council (28.10.2015): Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Bahame Tom Nyanduga,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1451399567_a-hrc-30-57-en.docx, accessed on March 23, 2016